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1. Introduction 
People communicate with others in many of their daily interactions, and much of 
that communication takes place by means of costless, non-binding messages (cheap talk). 
Apparently, one reason why people exchange messages is because they can often improve 
their payoff when they communicate. In fact, there is abundant experimental evidence in 
line with this, even if the communicators are anonymous subjects playing one-shot games. 
Thus, Sally (1995) offer a meta-analysis of social dilemma experiments conducted from 
1958 to 1992 and report that non-binding promises raise cooperation by 30 percent, thus 
improving the average player’s payoff with respect to the case with no communication.1  
Social researchers have advanced different hypotheses in order to explain why non-
binding communication fosters efficiency, like (1) communication enhances group identity 
(Orbell et al., 1990), (2) communication acts as a coordinating device (Farrell and Rabin, 
1996), (3) communication raises payoff expectations on receivers, and senders feel badly 
if they let down those expectations (guilt aversion, as in Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), 
and (4) communication elicits social norms (Bicchieri, 2002). In this paper, we suggest that 
social norms are the key factor, and provide a game-theoretical model to account for the 
effect of communication. Our model posits that people care about social norms (Elster, 
1989; Becker, 1996; López-Pérez, 2008) in a conditional manner –intuitively, they feel 
painful emotions like shame when they transgress internalized norms that others respect. 
Further, we posit that players are heterogeneous,2 distinguishing between three types of 
people: (i) Selfish players who do not care at all about norms, (ii) H-players who find 
binding a norm of honesty, and (iii) EH-players who find binding a norm of fairness and 
honesty –more precisely, this norm commends to achieve and efficient and egalitarian (E) 
outcome and to be honest, which explains the acronym EH. 
A key message from the paper is that the interaction between these three types of 
agents is crucial to understand the effect of communication. For instance, the data shows 
–see Sally (1995)- that (a) some people cooperate (under certain conditions) even if they 
cannot communicate, (b) communication increases cooperation (which suggests that some 
people cooperate only if there is prior communication), and (c) some people never 
cooperate in social dilemmas, even if pre-play talk is available. These phenomena are 
                                                 
1 Ledyard (1995, pp. 156-8) and Bicchieri (2002) survey the evidence on communication in public 
good games and social dilemmas, while Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) review some related 
psychological literature. In addition, Crawford (1998) survey the experimental evidence on how 
communication affects coordination on efficient outcomes.  
2 The idea that agents are heterogeneous in their pro-sociality is consistent with a large body of 
experimental data. To start, the evidence from social dilemmas without pre-play talk (Croson, 2000; 
Brandts and Schram, 2001, Fischbacher et al., 2001) points out that some subjects are conditional 
cooperators who cooperate if they expect others to cooperate as well, while remaining subjects 
rarely cooperate. In addition, recent lab evidence shows as well that subjects differ in their 
propensity to tell the truth (Gneezy, 2005; Sanchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007). 
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respectively explained by the presence of EH-types, H-types, and selfish types. In effect, 
EH-players cooperate if they expect their co-player to cooperate as well –that is, they are 
conditional cooperators- and their presence explains why some people cooperate even if 
they cannot talk. In turn, communication increases cooperation because it allows H-types 
to make promises and hence commit themselves to cooperate. Is that ever an optimal 
strategy? Yes, if they believe that the promise receiver is an EH-player, that is, the type of 
person who cooperates conditionally and hence would defect if the sender announced 
defection. Finally, selfish agents are necessary to explain why cooperation sometimes fails 
to happen, even if communication is available. 
In line with the available experimental evidence, the model also points out that the 
effectiveness of pre-play talk subtly depends on a number of variables, like the content of 
the messages sent and received, the order of play of the message sender, the number of 
message senders and receivers, and the expected price of being sincere. In addition, 
simple extensions of the basic model can explain why players in sender-receiver games 
tend to transmit more information than a standard analysis would predict and why people 
are often willing to spend resources to punish cheaters. 
Recent theories of other-regarding preferences, which relax the standard 
assumption that all agents are selfish, are closely related to our model.3 Rabin (1993) 
model reciprocity in normal-form, two-player games as the idea that people are kind to 
those who are kind to them, and harm those who harm them. Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) extend Rabin’s ideas to extensive form games. Levine (1998) assume 
type-based altruism and spitefulness, and both Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) propose models of inequity-averse players. Finally, Charness and Rabin 
(2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), and Cox et al. (2007) introduce both reciprocity and 
distributive concerns. 
In contrast to our theory, these models cannot account for the effect of 
communication on efficiency. Models of inequity aversion, for instance, assume that 
players’ utility only depends on the distribution of material payoffs, that is, something that 
cheap talk cannot shape by definition. As a result, communication has no effect on best-
responses and equilibria of the action stage subgame. In order to say something more 
determinate, however, one might assume that pre-play talk affects players’ expectations, 
thus making some equilibria focal (Schelling, 1960). For instance, Farrell (1987) and 
Farrell and Rabin (1996) assume that communication acts as a coordinating device.4 
Although this focal point hypothesis shares some predictions with our model, it cannot 
replicate other predictions that are very consistent with the available evidence. In this 
regard, our impression is that some experimental phenomena (like the sanctioning of 
                                                 
3 Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006) extensively survey this literature. See also López-
Pérez (2008) for a detailed comparison between our model and some of these models.  
4 Consult also Aumann (1990) and Rabin (1994). See also Crawford (1998) or Aumann and Hart 
(2003) for extensive surveys of the literature on cheap talk. 
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cheaters in one-shot games with a punishment stage, or the effectiveness of pre-play talk 
in games with a unique equilibrium) are very difficult to clarify unless one assumes that 
communication shapes utility (and not only expectations). 
In this respect, we note that some recent papers analyze how communication 
shapes utility. Thus, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) combine inequity aversion and a 
fixed cost of lying in a hold-up game, and provide experimental evidence in line with this; 
Miettinen (2005) study a two-player game which is preceded by negotiations and assume 
that players feel badly if they deviate from the agreement; Demichelis and Weibull (2008) 
posit that players have a lexicographic preference for honesty (second to the material 
payoffs in the stage game) and analyze evolutionary stability in coordination games, and 
Kartik (2008) study sender-receiver games when the sender bears a cost of lying. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the basic 
model5 and section 3 studies how pre-play communication affects cooperation in social 
dilemmas. Section 4 proposes a number of simple extensions of the basic model to explain 
over-communication in sender-receiver games and the sanctioning of cheaters. Section 5 
concludes by mentioning some possible applications. 
2. The model 
Consider any n-player, extensive form game of perfect recall. Let N = {1,…, n} 
denote the set of players, z a terminal node, h an information set, and M(h) the set of 
available moves at h. Further, let  denote player i’s utility payoff at z, and  
denote player i’s monetary (material) payoff at z. 
)(zui )( zx i
A player may be given the opportunity to communicate at some information set of 
the game. We say that player A communicates with player B if she sends a message to B, 
and assume for the moment that messages can be used only to announce a player’s future 
actions (i.e., her intentions). Hence, a message is a statement of the type ‘I will play 
action a at information set h’.  Note well that (the submission of) a message is a formal 
move in the game tree (for expositional reasons, we term actions any other formal moves 
different than messages). To keep matters simple, and unless noted otherwise, we posit 
that sending a message is costless, that a communicator can always keep silent if she 
wishes so (as a matter of convenience, we consider silence a message), that players share 
a common language, and that communication occurs without noise –i.e., if B receives a 
message from A, it is common knowledge that B will interpret it as player A does. 
                                                 
5 This model is an extended version of the model in López-Pérez (2008) in that we allow for the 
possibility that some players care about honesty. This point was immaterial in López-Pérez (2008) 
because our focus there was on games where players cannot communicate. We showed there that 
abundant lab evidence from such class of games is consistent with our model, and discussed in detail 
the psychological intuition behind our hypotheses. The interested reader is therefore directed there 
for a lengthy discussion of these points. 
 4
The key hypothesis of the model is that there exist three types of players: EH, H, 
and Selfish –the reason for this terminology will be clear later. Unless otherwise noted, we 
posit that players’ types are private information and use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
(PBE) as a solution concept. We let ρ and μ respectively denote the probability of being an 
H and an EH-type -of course, the existence of selfish agents requires ρ + μ <1. 
Selfish players are risk neutral money-maximizers with utility function 
. In contrast, the utility of the other two types depends on the money earned 
 but also on norms –i.e., rules indicating how one ought to move-, the intuition being 
that they feel ashamed or guilty if they violate a binding norm. To formalize this, we first 
formally define norms: 
)()( zxzu ii =
)(zxi
Definition 1: A norm is a nonempty correspondence ψ: h → M(h) applying on any 
information set, except on Nature’s ones. 
This concept allows us to introduce some new terms. First, we say that a player 
respects or complies with any norm ψ at h if (i) her move at h is consistent with that norm 
or if (ii) she does not move at h. Otherwise, she deviates from ψ. Further, we denote by R 
(ψ,  z) the set of players who respected ψ in the history of z, and by r  (ψ,  z)∈[0, 1] the 
overall proportion of players who respected ψ in the history of z. Note well that these two 
concepts are exogenous ones (as ψ), not equilibrium ones. 
EH and H-types are different because they care about different norms: The EH-
norm and the H-norm, respectively, which we precisely define below. However, the utility 
function of both types has the same structure (in the following expression, ψ denotes the 
EH-norm if the player is an EH-type and the H-norm if the player is an H-type): 
γ−)(zxi  · r (ψ, z)                   if ∉i  R (ψ, z), )0 ( γ<  
    = { )(zui
)(zxi                                     if ∈i  R (ψ, z)             
In other words, EH and H-types suffer a psychological cost when they deviate from 
the norm that they find binding –for this reason, we will refer sometimes to both of them 
as principled types. Crucially, the strength of this cost positively depends on the proportion 
of people who respect the norm.6 We make five remarks on this hypothesis. First, its 
intuition has to do with the psychology of shame, an emotion that is strongly correlated 
with inferiority feelings, as we have argued in López-Pérez (2005). Second, it introduces 
reciprocal behavior: EH and H-types are more likely to respect their own norms if they 
expect sufficiently many players to comply as well - abundant lab evidence supports the 
idea that (some) humans behave in a reciprocal manner; consult Fehr and Gächter (2000). 
                                                 
6 In López-Pérez (2008) we assumed that this cost depends on the number (and not the proportion) 
of players who respect the norm. Both specifications render qualitatively similar results in the games 
analyzed there, but we now believe that our new modeling choice is empirically more valid 
(especially in multiple-player games). For this reason, we opted for it here.  
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Third, although we assume for simplicity that the cost increases linearly with r  (ψ, z), our 
results do not depend on this (what is essential here is that the cost is strictly increasing). 
Fourth, parameter γ can be interpreted as a player’s internalization index. Finally, note 
that the cost is null if nobody complies with the norm: To put it like this, there is no 
preference for norm compliance per se. Although adding an unconditional cost in our 
model would be direct, we have chosen not to do that because the available evidence 
(Fehr and Gächter, 2000) suggests that most cooperative behavior occurs conditionally, 
hence rejecting the idea of a (significant) fixed cost.  
We must be precise about the EH and H-norms in order to obtain determinate 
behavioral predictions and test the model. Basically, the H-norm is a norm of honesty (this 
explains its name), while the EH-norm is a norm of distributive justice (which implies 
cooperation) and honesty. 
Definition 2 (The H-norm): At any h where the mover can communicate, this 
correspondence selects any available message. At any other h, it selects action a∈ M(h) if 
the mover announced a previously with a message, and the whole set M(h) otherwise. 
In other words, this norm affirms that anyone who sends a message about her 
future intentions ought to honor her word later and act as announced. Since the H-norm 
restricts behavior only when a player can communicate, it follows that the utility function 
of an H-type who cannot communicate collapses to that of a selfish player. We pass now to 
describe the EH-norm, for which we need to introduce an additional concept. 
Definition 3: Let t0 denote any initial decision node of the game –i.e., any node 
immediately following Nature’s moves (if any)- and X(t0) denote the set of all allocations of 
monetary payoffs that succeed t0 (we assume it to be a compact set). Allocation 
 is an (Efficient and Egalitarian) E-allocation of t)(t),...,( 01 Xxxx n ∈= 0 if it maximizes 
function (0 < δ <1) 
                                           (1) }){min }{max()( i
Ni
i
NiNi
i
E xxxxF ∈∈∈
−−= ∑ δ
over X(t0). A path connecting node t0 and one of its E-allocations is an E-path of the 
game. An E-action is an action that belongs to at least one E-path. 
Assumption 0< δ <1 implies that any E-allocation is necessarily Pareto efficient (this 
can be easily proved by contradiction). Hence, one can see an E-allocation as a Pareto 
efficient allocation that, in comparison with other available monetary allocations, is not too 
unequal and socially inefficient. Note that we use for simplicity a very rudimentary 
measure of inequity (the largest distance between players’ incomes), but more 
sophisticated measures could be easily introduced. 
Definition 4 (The EH-norm): At any h where a player can communicate, this 
norm selects silence and any message announcing an E-action. At any other h, the norm 
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selects (i) action a M(h) if the mover announced a previously, and (ii) any E-action of h 
otherwise -if there is no E-action, the norm selects the whole set M(h). 
∈
There are a number of ideas buried in this definition. To start, this norm commends 
to achieve an E-allocation and to be honest. For this reason, the EH-norm and the H-norm 
are rather different: The EH-norm is not only a norm of honesty but also a norm of 
distributive justice (because it commends to achieve a fair allocation). Additionally, the 
EH-norm asks for moral coherence in that it only allows announcements of E-actions, a 
point that seems natural: If E-actions are the ‘right’ actions and moreover announcements 
are morally binding, it does not make sense to announce something different. 
We finish with two remarks. First, the reader may wonder why we consider the EH 
and the H-norm and not other norms. Observe that the complexity of the model increases 
with the number of norms. This motivated us to limit that number to the minimum possible 
- in any case, the model is flexible enough to easily include additional heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, both norms are relatively simple and they embody assumptions that happen 
to be consistent with much experimental evidence. For instance, the idea present in the 
EH-norm that both efficiency and payoff equality are basic ingredients of fairness can 
explain a very good deal of the experimental evidence from games without 
communication, as the results in López-Pérez (2008) attest. Second, the model assumes 
that both EH and H types care about honesty, whereas only the EH-types care about 
fairness (or social preferences). As we show throughout the paper, this hypothesis is in 
line with the data from numerous experimental studies, including a within-subject study by 
Hurkens and Kartik (forthcoming) (see section 4.1). However, why are principled players 
heterogeneous? Intuitively, many of us feel badly if we deviate from a binding norm and 
we are unable to morally justify that behavior (Elster, 1999). In this regard, we conjecture 
that finding excuses for lying might be relatively more difficult than finding excuses for not 
cooperating,7 and that might account for heterogeneity. In any case, additional within-
subjects studies are required to further clarify this point.    
3. Communication in Social Dilemmas 
This section studies how communication affects cooperation in social dilemmas. To 
organize the exposition, we present a number of predictions of the model. For each 
prediction, we provide a simple example to illustrate it and (when available) some 
supporting experimental evidence.8 To clarify the net effect of communication on 
                                                 
7 This might be especially true in lab experiments, which are often anonymous settings: For instance, 
since it is uncertain whether the other participants are richer or less needy, some subjects might feel 
entitled not to cooperate and hence behave as a selfish person would do. In contrast, this same 
people might have no excuse to cheat others. 
8 To organize the exposition, we finish the discussion on each prediction with a black square (▪). 
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cooperation, we first analyze some determinants of cooperation when communication is 
not available. 
Prediction  1: Some players may cooperate in equilibrium even if they cannot 
communicate. The actual rate of cooperation depends on the constellation of monetary 
payoffs and the proportion of principled types. 
Example: Table 1 depicts monetary payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) lab 
game. In this game, each player chooses between cooperation (action C) and defection 
(action D). Both earn c monetary units if they cooperate and d if they defect. Further, a 
unilateral defector gets a ‘temptation’ payment of t while a unilateral cooperator gets a 
normalized payoff of zero. Payoffs satisfy t > c > d > 0 so that defection strictly dominates 
cooperation in monetary terms, and 2c > t so that mutual cooperation is socially efficient. 
Assume that the PD players make their choices simultaneously and that they cannot 
communicate with each other. To get utility payoffs, we note two things: (i) As players 
cannot communicate, the utility of an H-type coincides with that of a selfish type, (ii) 
condition 2c > t implies that (c, c) is the only E-allocation of this game and cooperation the 
only E-action. With this in mind, table 2 illustrates players’ utility payoffs if Row is selfish 
(or an H-type) and Column is an EH-type (other cases are direct from this). Trivially, Row’s 
payoffs coincide with her own pecuniary payoffs. On the other hand, Column gets some 
disutility if he deviates unilaterally from the EH-norm, while he feels no disutility if both 
players defect. 
 
 C D 
C c, c 0, t 
D t, 0 d, d 
 C D 
C c, c 0, t ‐ γ /2 
D t, 0 d, d 
        Table 1: Monetary payoffs in the PD                   Table 2: Utility Payoffs if Row (Column) is selfish (EH) 
 
Inspection of table 2 indicates that a selfish player (or an H-player) never 
cooperates in equilibrium. In contrast, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which 
the EH-players cooperate if the following inequality holds (this indicates that cooperation is 
optimal for them):  
dtc ⋅−+−≥⋅ )1()2( µγµµ ,                                                                     (2) 
that is, if μ is larger than 
simµ = 
2γ++− ctd
d
.                                                                                    (3) 
The intuition behind this equilibrium is straightforward. Selfish and H-players defect 
to maximize their monetary payoff. In contrast, EH-types cooperate if the probability μ 
that the co-player is also an EH type is large enough, as defection is likely to be unilateral 
in this case and hence entail a psychological cost. Of course, this cost should be large 
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enough in order to sustain cooperation -observe in this regard that 1 ≥ μsim requires γ ≥ 2∙(t‐
c) so that no cooperation is expected if γ < 2∙(t‐c). Finally, we note that there exists an 
additional equilibrium in which all types of players defect (this equilibrium exists for any 
value of μ). In this sense, cooperation also requires that the EH-types find the former, 
cooperative equilibrium more intuitive than this latter equilibrium. We implicitly assume 
this in what follows. 
Experimental evidence for prediction 1: The model predicts that some players (the EH-
types) cooperate, which is consistent with abundant evidence –consult Sally (1995) for a 
meta-analysis. The model also predicts that cooperation requires at least a mass μsim of 
EH-types. This means that EH-types are conditional or reciprocal cooperators: They 
cooperate only if the co-player is likely to cooperate as well, a prediction well supported by 
the data from numerous experiments –see again Sally (1995) or Croson (2000). 
Finally, note that μsim decreases with c and increases with t and d. Since cooperation 
is hindered as μsim increases, the model consequently forecasts that cooperation depends 
directly on c, and indirectly on t and d, which is again consistent with the lab evidence –
see Rapoport and Chammah (1965, pp. 36-39), and Clark et al. (2001). A possible 
interpretation of this result is that cooperation respects the law of demand: Cooperation 
decreases when its price increases –to understand this, observe that the expected price of 
cooperation dct ⋅−+−⋅ )1()( µµ  depends negatively on c and positively on t and d.▪ 
While prediction 1 indicates that the constellation of material payoffs should affect 
the cooperation rate, we note that other factors may play a role as well, even if 
communication is not available. In particular, a key factor is the information that each 
player has about the other players’ moves. In effect, since the EH-players cooperate 
conditionally, cooperation might be enhanced if players can observe whether others 
cooperated. As a result, the order in which players move –i.e., simultaneously or 
sequentially- matters. 
Prediction 2: The rate of cooperation depends on the order of play. 
Example: To illustrate this, consider the sequential PD game –i.e., one of the players 
chooses after observing her co-player’s move. We will show that the equilibrium 
cooperation rate is higher in the sequential PD game than in the simultaneous one.  
Since allocation (c, c) is the only E-allocation, it follows that both players cooperate 
in the unique E-path of this game (see definition 3). Consequently, the EH-norm 
commends the first mover to cooperate, while the second mover should cooperate if the 
first mover cooperated. In contrast, the EH-norm allows the second mover to choose any 
action if the first mover defected and hence deviated from the E-path (see definition 4). 
Figure 1 depicts players’ payoffs if both players are EH (upper payoffs correspond to the 
first mover; further, E-actions are identified by an arrow).  
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reciprocation falls as its material cost rises, something that is also consistent with our 
model, as reciprocation is predicted only if )(2 ct −≥γ . Finally, Hayashi et al. (1999) 
and Clark et al. (2001) report that the sequential game elicits a higher rate of cooperation 
than the simultaneous one.▪ 
While predictions 1 and 2 are useful as a benchmark for later comparisons, our 
main focus is on how communication increases cooperation. The next prediction first 
considers this issue. 
Prediction  3: Pre-play communication can foster cooperation. The efficacy of 
communication depends on the content of the message. 
Example: We return to the simultaneous PD, assuming now that unilateral (one-
way) pre-play communication is available. That is, prior to playing the PD, one of the 
players (the sender) can either send a non-binding message announcing her future move 
or stay silent. We call this the communication stage, to distinguish it from the action stage, 
where the proper PD is played. The combination of both stages forms the entire game. 
We first elucidate what actions and messages are selected by the EH-norm and the 
H-norm at each information set. To start, the EH-norm selects silence or message ‘C’ in 
the communication stage. In the action stage, in turn, the EH-norm distinguishes between 
players: While the sender should move C if she announced ‘C’ or kept silent, and D if she 
announced ‘D’; the other player (the receiver) should always move C. Finally, the H-norm 
selects any message but commends to play accordingly later, and selects any action if a 
player kept silent (note that this applies also to the receiver). 
 
Silence ‘C’ 
‘D’ 
Message 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 C D 
C c 0 
D t – γ /2 d 
 C D 
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Figure 2: Sender’s utility payoffs for any possible strategy profile (the three upper matrices depict an EH-sender’s 
payoffs, while the lower three ones depict an H-sender’s ones) 
 
Taking all this into account, figure 2 depicts utility payoffs for an EH and an H-
sender and for any possible strategy profile. The upper tree indicates available messages, 
while the posterior matrices indicate the sender’s payoffs for each possible message and 
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combination of players’ choices in the action stage (in the payoff matrices, the sender is 
assumed without loss of generality to be the row player; further, the three upper matrices 
correspond to an EH-sender; the three lower ones to an H-sender). 
If } ),(2max{ dct −⋅≥γ  and μ is large, the game has a PBE in which (i) any type 
of sender announces ‘C’, EH and H senders cooperate afterwards, and selfish ones defect, 
(ii) any type of sender defects if she made an announcement different than ‘C’, (iii) an EH 
receiver cooperates if his co-player announced ‘C’ and defects otherwise, and (iv) a selfish 
or H-receiver defects whatever the message received. Since H-senders find optimal to 
cooperate in this PBE, average cooperation here is larger than in the cooperative 
equilibrium of the simultaneous PD game with no communication (in this equilibrium, only 
the EH-types cooperate). Therefore, communication can raise cooperation in this game. 
We now prove that the above mentioned conditions (i) to (iv) indeed characterize 
an equilibrium strategy profile. First, it is obvious that a selfish sender or receiver acts 
optimally (note that selfish senders mimic the other types’ announcement to prevent 
signaling their type), and the same is true for an H-receiver. In addition, figure 2 indicates 
that EH and H-senders should also defect if they sent a message different than ‘C’ (among 
other reasons because the receiver will not cooperate then). As a result, and 
independently of the beliefs off the equilibrium path, defection is also optimal for an EH-
receiver if the sender previously announced something different than ‘C’ (recall that EH-
types cooperate reciprocally).  
On the contrary, an EH-sender who previously announced ‘C’ should cooperate if 
dtc ⋅−+−≥⋅−+⋅ )1()2(0)1( µγµµµ , that is, if her prior μ is larger than (observe that 
this is identical to expression (3), the threshold with no communication): 
simµ  = 
2γ++− ctd
d
 .                                                                                  
This line of reasoning also applies to an EH receiver who received message ‘C’, with 
the only caveat that now it is ρ + μ (and not only μ) what should be larger than threshold 
μsim, since both EH and H senders are expected to cooperate. In turn, inspection of figure 2 
indicates that an H sender who announces ‘C’ would rather honor her word if  
)()1(2)2)(1()2(0)1( ctddtc −⋅+⋅−≥⇔−−+−≥⋅−+⋅ µµγγµγµµµ ,        
which holds true if } ),(2max{ dct −⋅≥γ . To finish with the proof, note that 
announcement ‘C’ is better than any other one (in particular, it is better than silence) for 
an EH and an H-sender if dc ≥⋅µ .                                                                                                
There are several intuitions behind this equilibrium. Note first that the selfish 
senders go for the maximal money payoff, and hence defect independently of the message 
sent. In contrast, the other senders are honest and cooperate if they announced it before 
(provided that cooperation is not too costly). When do they announce that? Clearly, only if 
the receiver is expected to cooperate as well. However, the only receivers who might 
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cooperate are the conditional cooperators –i.e., the EH-types. Consequently, the EH and 
H-senders commit themselves to cooperate only if the share μ of EH-types is large 
enough. Since cooperative announcements are likely to be truthful in this case, EH-
receivers reciprocate and cooperate as well. 
We stress that the previous PBE is not the only equilibrium of the game. To start, 
one can find slight variations of the previous equilibrium, like an equilibrium in which EH-
senders keep silent and then cooperate, while H-senders announce ‘C’ and cooperate 
afterwards. More importantly, there exist additional equilibria in which all types of players 
defect along the equilibrium path for any parameter constellation (these equilibria with 
unanimous defection are the correlate of the equilibrium in which all types defect in the 
simultaneous PD without pre-play communication; there exist multiple such equilibria 
because selfish types are then indifferent between announcements). For communication to 
raise cooperation, therefore, we need that players coordinate on a cooperative equilibrium 
and not on this kind of equilibria. 
Prediction 3 is a very important implication of our assumption that people have a 
taste for honesty. Yet we note that other alternative hypotheses could explain it. In 
particular, communication could foster cooperation if it acts as a coordinating device, even 
if players have no concern for honesty. To illustrate this point, consider the simultaneous 
PD again, but now assuming that both players are sufficiently inequity-averse (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). It is well known that the game has two pure 
strategy equilibria (mutual cooperation and defection) in this case so that coordination is a 
key issue (recall that something similar happens with our model). If one-way 
communication is available, however, one could apply the hypothesis in Farrell and Rabin 
(1996) that self-committing, self-signaling messages are always trusted.10 This restriction 
on post-message beliefs reduces the number of equilibria of the entire game and facilitates 
coordination on the most efficient equilibrium. Thus, a combined model (inequity aversion 
+ communication refinement) predicts two refined equilibrium paths in the entire game. In 
one path, the sender announces ‘C’ and both players cooperate afterwards; in the other 
path the sender keeps silent and then mutual cooperation follows –announcing ‘D’ is never 
optimal because it leads to the ‘bad’ equilibrium (D, D). Since communication ensures 
cooperation, this could explain why communication increases efficiency. We will show later, 
though, that this coordination hypothesis fails to replicate other predictions of our model. 
Experimental evidence for prediction 3: Under certain conditions, our model predicts a 
rise in average cooperation if one player is allowed to communicate. This is consistent with 
                                                 
10 A message is self-committing if the sender wants to honor it in case she believes that the receiver 
believes it -the message must be part of an equilibrium strategy profile of the action stage subgame. 
For instance, both ‘C’ and ‘D’ are self-committing in the simultaneous PD game if both players are 
sufficiently inequity averse. Further, a message is self-signaling when the sender prefers the receiver 
to play a best response to it if and only if the message is true –e.g., both ‘C’ and ‘D’ are self-
signaling messages in the PD game if both players are sufficiently inequity averse. 
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the available experimental evidence. For instance, Duffy and Feltovich (2002) report that 
the introduction of one-way cheap talk increases the rate of cooperation from 22% to 40% 
(in any information condition, subjects played ten times the same simultaneous PD game 
against different opponents).  
Further, the model indicates that cooperation fundamentally depends on the 
content of the message: Nobody cooperates after sending or receiving a ‘D’ message, 
while some types cooperate after sending or receiving a ‘C’ message. The intuition here is 
twofold: (i) A significant number of people honor their word and (ii) some people respond 
reciprocally to messages. Consistent with all this, Duffy and Feltovich (2002) report that 
receivers condition their actions on the message they receive –i.e., they cooperate 
significantly more when they receive message ‘C’ that when they receive ‘D’ (50.4% vs. 
16.1%).11 Moreover, senders often announce truthful messages (‘C’ messages are truthful 
half of the time, and ‘D’ messages 85% of the time). 
To finish, we predict that cooperation requires both γ and μ to be large enough 
( },max{ cd
simµµ ≥ ). Interestingly, and as μsim and cd  depend negatively on the monetary 
payoff c and positively on d (μsim also depends positively on t), it follows that cooperation 
becomes more unlikely if, say, the difference c-d decreases (recall that the model also 
predicts this phenomenon if PD players cannot talk). This might explain the results in 
Charness (2000) from a PD experiment with unilateral communication. The payoff 
calibration was such that c-d was rather small, and Charness reports that, although most 
senders announced cooperation, most senders and receivers defected afterwards.▪ 
Prediction 3 indicates that communication can raise cooperation. As we will see, 
however, the amount of the increase depends on several factors. One of them is the order 
of play –i.e., sequential or simultaneous- in the action stage subgame.  
Prediction 4: The net effect of communication on cooperation depends on the order 
of play in the action stage. In particular, messages are ineffective if the sender moves 
before the receiver in the action stage. 
Example: Consider the sequential PD when one-way communication is available. 
Does pre-play talk foster cooperation, as in the simultaneous PD? Interestingly, the answer 
depends on who sends the message. To start, communication improves nothing if the 
sender happens to move first in the action stage. In effect, recall from our equilibrium 
analysis of the sequential PD without pre-play talk (prediction 2) that first movers only 
cooperate if they expect the second mover to cooperate as well, something that requires in 
turn that the second mover is an EH type (and that γ is large enough). In this respect, it is 
clear that giving the voice only to the first mover cannot increase the probability that the 
second mover cooperates: Selfish second movers never cooperate, and the same happens 
                                                 
11 Contrary to our model, though, both senders and receivers cooperated in the same proportion. 
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with the H second movers if they cannot communicate and make promises. Consequently, 
pre-play talk should not change the incentives to cooperate of the first mover: As in the 
case without prior communication, she will cooperate only if she expects to be matched 
with an EH second mover.  
The scenario is rather different when the message sender is the second mover. To 
see this, suppose that the second mover is an H type. Recall from prediction 2 that such 
type of player does not cooperate if she cannot talk. If she can talk, in contrast, she should 
announce ‘C’ and subsequently cooperate in equilibrium if the mass μ of EH-types is larger 
than c
d . The intuition is that by credibly promising to cooperate, an H-second mover can 
entice the first mover to reciprocate and cooperate as well, thus earning a higher payoff 
than if she announces ‘D’ or keeps silent. 
Experimental  evidence  for  prediction  4:  To sum up, unilateral communication should 
increase cooperation in a sequential dilemma if the second mover can communicate, but 
not when the first mover is the message sender. More generally, promises from agent A to 
agent B are useless if A makes all choices before B starts moving, as these promises do 
not add any relevant information (to put it like this, actions ‘crowd out’ words) and do not 
affect B’s incentives to cooperate. The experimental results from Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2006) are very much consistent with this prediction. More precisely, they 
study a sequential dilemma with a random shock (this is immaterial for our results), and 
three of their treatments are of particular interest to us: A first one in which no subject 
could communicate, a second one in which the first mover could communicate, and a third 
one in which the second mover could communicate (subjects always communicated by 
means of free-form messages). The authors report that the percentages of mutual 
cooperation that these three treatments elicited were respectively 20%, 26%, and 50%. 
Consistent with our model, the first two percentages are not significantly different while 
the third one is higher than the others. Further, mutual cooperation in the third treatment 
was much higher following a statement of intent or promise than otherwise (recall that 
subjects were free to write whatever they wanted in their messages). 
We note that the coordination hypothesis (Farrell and Rabin, 1996) cannot account 
for the increase in cooperation in the sequential PD. The reason is that most models of 
other-regarding preferences (like inequity aversion models) predict a unique equilibrium in 
the sequential PD, and hence coordination is not an issue here. The data from Charness 
and Dufwenberg (2006) is also at odds with the idea that communication works because it 
enhances group identity (in this case, it should not matter who talks for pre-play talk to be 
effective). In contrast, it can be explained as the result of guilt aversion (i.e., people do 
not like to let down other players’ expectations), provided that promises affect beliefs, as 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) hypothesize. 
As additional evidence, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) report one phenomenon 
that can be explained by guilt aversion but not by our model. More precisely, first movers 
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were asked to guess the proportion of second movers who would reciprocate if the first 
mover cooperated, while second movers were asked to guess the average guess made by 
the first movers who cooperated (both were paid for accuracy). A probit regression using 
the data from the second and third treatments then shows that a second mover’s decision 
to cooperate is significantly correlated with her guess, but not with a dummy for the 
treatment. Our theory cannot explain such correlation –observe however that the model 
correctly forecasts a shift in the second mover’s guess if she can communicate and make 
promises (as in the third treatment).12 Yet we note two things in this respect. First, guilt 
aversion is not the only possible explanation for this correlation, as argued in Vanberg 
(forthcoming). Second, we report in the next section some evidence that is at odds with 
guilt aversion (or at least with a simple specification of the model) but not with our model 
–Vanberg (forthcoming) also provides evidence that suggests that people dislike breaking 
promises, and that is inconsistent with guilt aversion.▪ 
We have just shown that the effect of communication on cooperation may depend 
on the structure of the action stage. In addition, the structure of the communication stage 
–i.e., the communication protocol- may also play a role. 
Prediction  5a: The net effect of communication on cooperation depends on the 
communication protocol employed. In particular, cooperation sometimes increases with the 
number of message senders. 
Example: To illustrate this point, we consider the simultaneous PD when bilateral 
(two-way), simultaneous pre-play talk is available -i.e., both players send messages 
simultaneously in the communication stage. In this game, the EH-norm commends both 
players to announce ‘C’ (or keep silent) and to honor in any case their prior 
announcements. The H-norm allows both players to send any message but they should 
play according to it in the action stage. If one player keeps silent, the EH-norm commends 
her to cooperate afterwards, whereas the H-norm selects any move. 
Following a similar reasoning as the one used in prediction 3, one can easily show 
that there exists an equilibrium where EH and H types announce ‘C’ and then cooperate if 
μ is large enough and )(2 ct −≥γ  (selfish types announce cooperation as well but 
defect afterwards). We make several remarks on this equilibrium. First, since any H player 
cooperates in this equilibrium, the corresponding cooperation rate is larger than the 
highest rate in the PD game with one-way communication (where the H receivers do not 
cooperate, recall the analysis in prediction 3). Hence, our model predicts that, under 
certain conditions, cooperation should increase with the number of message senders. The 
                                                 
12 Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 1593) give additional arguments against a model assuming a 
fixed cost of lying (recall that we do not make this assumption). For instance, they claim that people 
do not suffer from lying in certain contexts, as when playing poker. However, this seems easily 
explainable by our approach: Implicitly, the rules (norms) of poker allow some deceptive use of 
language -it is indeed part of the fun of poker!     
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intuition is clear: More H-types can commit to cooperate if the communication structure is 
rich. Second, we yet stress that there exist additional equilibria in which everybody defects 
along the equilibrium path. Consequently, cooperation requires that the players coordinate 
on the cooperative equilibrium.  
Third, it is crucial that the mass μ of EH types is large. In particular, this 
equilibrium does not exist if μ is small but ρ is large –i.e., if there exists a large mass of H 
types. To clarify this point, consider the extreme case ρ = 1 so that both PD players are H 
types. One can then show that, in equilibrium, both players must announce ‘D’ or silence 
and then defect. This might appear counterintuitive. At first sight, there seems to be 
another equilibrium in which both H players promise cooperation and cooperate afterwards 
if γ is high enough. Nevertheless, a bit of reflection indicates that this behavior is not 
sustainable because, whatever the co-player’s announcement, an H player gets more 
money and feels no remorse if she announces defection and defects afterwards. In short, 
communication and honesty alone cannot generate cooperation in the PD. Fourth, a model 
based on the joint idea that people have social preferences –as in, say, Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999)- and that communication acts as a coordination device (Farrell, 1987; Farrell and 
Rabin, 1996) seems at odds with prediction 5a. In effect, since one-way communication 
should be sufficient to ensure coordination on the efficient equilibrium, it follows that two-
way communication should not increase cooperation. 
Although cooperation in the simultaneous PD game directly depends on the number 
of message senders, we note that more is not always better: In some games, cooperation 
does not increase as more people can communicate. This point, which is very related to 
prediction 4, can be illustrated with the sequential PD. Recall from prediction 4 that 
allowing the first mover in the sequential PD to announce his future move is ineffectual in 
raising the cooperation rate. Consequently, two-way communication generates more 
cooperation than one-way communication only if the first mover was the message sender 
with one-way communication. 
Experimental evidence for prediction 5a: We are not aware of any economic experiment 
that compares cooperation levels in the simultaneous PD game with one-way and two-way 
communication. However, Sally (1995) meta-analysis suggests that two-way 
communication has a strong positive effect on cooperation. In effect, the author finds that 
the presence of discussion –a form of bilateral communication- in one-shot social dilemma 
games is highly significant, and on average raises the cooperation rate by more than 45 
percentage points. In addition, and in line with our model, Orbell et al. (1990) contend 
that discussion is effective because it allows subjects to make multilateral promises to 
cooperate, which are significantly more binding than unilateral ones. More focused 
experimental research would be welcome.▪ 
Given all previous predictions, we can rank each treatment according to the 
frequency of mutual cooperation in equilibrium. Table 3 summarizes our results in this 
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respect (in the sequential PD, we assume that the message sender with one-way 
communication is the second mover, we also assume in each treatment that players 
coordinate in the cooperative equilibrium). For instance, since only the EH types are 
expected to cooperate in the simultaneous PD with no pre-play talk (prediction 1), it 
follows that the frequency of mutual cooperation is μ2. The reader can elaborate a ranking 
just by directly comparing these frequencies.   
  Communication Stage 
  No Pre-play Talk One-way Talk Two-way Talk 
Simultaneous PD μ2 μ2 + ρ ∙μ μ2 + 2ρ ∙μ 
Action Stage 
Sequential PD μ μ + ρ∙μ μ + ρ∙μ 
                   
                          Table 3: Frequency of mutual cooperation in each communication treatment 
Table 3 clearly shows, as we have stressed throughout the paper, that the order of 
play in the action stage affects the cooperation rate. Our following prediction suggests that 
the order of play in the communication stage might have an effect as well. 
Prediction  5b:  The net effect of communication on cooperation depends on the 
communication protocol employed. In particular, average cooperation might vary if the 
order in which players communicate changes (if there are multiple message senders). 
Example: To think about this point, consider first the simultaneous PD game with 
bilateral pre-play communication. Clearly, bilateral communication can be simultaneous or 
sequential (one player sends first a message, her co-player observes it and sends 
afterwards another message). It is then a natural question which type of bilateral 
communication is more effective in fostering cooperation. The answer is that both work 
equally well here because, whatever the players’ types, both mechanisms induce the same 
equilibria –as one can prove with a line of reasoning similar to that of prediction 3. To put 
it like this, bilateral communication achieves maximal cooperation in the simultaneous PD 
even if no one has the first word.   
 C1 C2 D 
C1 c, c  0, 0  0, t 
C2 0, 0  c, c 0, t 
D t, 0  t, 0 d, d 
 
                     Table 4: A Social Dilemma with Two Equally Efficient Outcomes  
Yet we believe that this result should not be generalized to any social dilemma. The 
two-player game at Table 4 coincides with the PD game of table 1 except that each player 
has available two possible cooperative moves (C1, and C2). Importantly, this game has 
two E-paths -(C1, C1) and (C2, C2)-, as both lead to the E-allocation (c, c). If players can 
talk before playing the game and they talk sequentially, our model predicts cooperation in 
a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria if the mass of EH types is large enough (the 
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model has also other equilibria in which players defect along the equilibrium path; the 
reader can prove all this by applying a similar reasoning to that of prediction 3). In these 
equilibria, the first message sender randomizes with some probability between 
announcements ‘C1’ and ‘C2’, the second sender responds with the same announcement 
as the first one, and both players honor their words afterwards if they are principled –of 
course, we need )(2 ct −≥γ  for this to be optimal. 
One can also prove that the game has multiple mixed strategy equilibria if the 
players talk simultaneously and not sequentially. Consequently, players have to coordinate 
in both cases. Our point here is that coordination seems much more likely to succeed in 
the game with sequential talk that in the other one: Giving the first word to one player 
may help when the action stage subgame has multiple E-paths, as in the game of table 4. 
One possible reason might be that a focal point (Schelling, 1960) of the type ‘first come, 
first served’ helps to coordinate players’ beliefs when there is an unequivocal first mover. 
Experimental evidence for prediction 5b: Some evidence from coordination games is in 
line with this focal point idea. Consult the survey in Camerer (2003) on matching games.▪ 
4. Complicating the basic setting 
The model described at section 2 can be extended in many ways. We propose here 
a number of them, and show them to be consistent with much available experimental 
evidence. 
4.1 Communication about past actions 
In the previous section, players exchanged messages about their future moves, 
that is, their intentions. In general, however, players can also exchange messages about 
players’ past moves (for expositional reasons, we take this to include messages about 
Nature’s moves, that is, random shocks). To analyze honesty in this kind of situations, we 
introduce a slight change in the H and EH-norms. 
For this, note first that the interpretation of a message in this setting depends on its 
timing. Consider a message sent at information set h1 and such that it announces action 
a  at some h)( 2hM∈ 2. This message means ‘the mover at h2 played a’ if h2 precedes h1, and 
‘the mover at h2 would choose a if she had to move at h2’ otherwise. Taking into account 
this, we say that a message is a lie about past actions if it announces at least one previous 
action that the sender knows not to be on any possible previous path of play. More 
precisely, we have 
Definition 5: Let h’ denote any information set that precedes h. A message sent at 
h is a lie about past actions if it announces action a’ )'(hA∈  at h’ and a’ does not point 
towards h. 
In other words, a message is a lie about past actions if it is impossible that 
someone acted as announced, and the sender knows that for sure. Admittedly, this is a 
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restrictive definition: In common parlance, we often consider that a message about past 
behavior is a lie if the sender deems most likely that nobody acted as announced (even if 
he is not totally sure about this issue). Thus if one says ‘Company X’s recorded assets and 
profits were not inflated’ but at the same time he believes that Company X most likely 
manipulated its financial statements, such utterance is commonly regarded as a lie. We 
leave aside this kind of subtleties, though, as they complicate the model and are not 
essential to explain the experimental phenomena that we consider later. In any case, the 
H-norm of definition 2 and the EH-norm of definition 4 can be now extended as follows: 
Definition 6 (The H-norm): At any h where the mover can communicate, this 
correspondence selects silence and any other message that is not a lie about past actions. 
At any other h, it selects action a∈ M(h) if the actor announced a previously, and the whole 
set M(h) otherwise. 
Definition 7 (The EH-norm): At any h where the mover can communicate, this 
norm selects silence and any other message that (i) is not a lie about past actions, and (ii) 
announces to play an E-action at any of the sender’s future information sets. At any other 
h, the norm selects (i) action a ∈ M(h) if the mover announced a previously, and (ii) any E-
action of h otherwise -if there is no E-action, the norm selects the whole set M(h). 
As the reader can confirm, the only difference between these norms and the ones 
considered in section 2 is that these new norms forbid lies about past actions. This is 
obviously immaterial for the games analyzed in section 3, where players could only 
communicate their intentions. Nevertheless, this point is obviously important if players can 
talk about past actions, as we show in what follows with a series of predictions.   
Prediction 6: People may transmit more information than a standard analysis would 
predict. 
Example: To illustrate this point, consider a sender-receiver game as in Crawford 
and Sobel (1982). In this class of games, one player (the sender) has private information 
about the realization of some random shock –i.e., about Nature’s previous move- and 
must send a message in this regard to another player (the receiver), who subsequently 
takes an action. We stress that the sender must send a message and hence cannot keep 
silent (as we note below, the predictions of the model would otherwise change). The 
monetary payoffs for both players depend on the action chosen by the receiver and the 
state of nature, but not on the message.  
In general, both the H-norm (definition 6) and the EH-norm (definition 7) commend 
the sender to announce the actual realization of the random shock, while the H-norm (the 
EH-norm) commends the receiver to choose any action (any E-action). That is, the H-norm 
does not restrict the receiver’s choices (because she cannot send any message), while the 
EH-norm is more restrictive if some of the actions available are not E-actions. With this in 
mind, and to simplify matters, we assume the following: (i) There are only two realizations 
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of the random shock (states of nature A and B) and both are equally likely, (ii) the 
receiver can choose only between two actions (a and b), (iii) the set of available monetary 
allocations coincides for any state of nature, and (iv) the available allocations are equally 
fair. This setting is relatively simple to study and moreover we have some experimental 
evidence on it. 
More precisely, suppose that the sender (receiver) earns m (M) if the action and 
the state of nature coincide –i.e., this corresponds to the cases (a, A) and (b, B)-, while 
the sender (receiver) earns M (m) otherwise (M > m). Note that the monetary incentives 
of the sender and the receiver are totally misaligned in this game. If all players were 
selfish, therefore, the sender should transmit the least information possible and thus 
choose uniformly between messages ‘A’ and ‘B’ –for a formal proof, see Sánchez-Pagés 
and Vorsatz (2007). In other words: Under the standard assumption that all players are 
self-interested, half of the messages should be false. When there is a large population of 
principled types, in contrast, most messages should be truthful. To be precise, the game 
has the following unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium if )mM(2 −>γ and μ + ρ > ½: 
o Whatever their type, receivers trust the sender’s message and play the action 
that coincides with the state of nature stated in the message. 
o Principled senders tell the truth, and selfish ones lie. 
The proof of this result goes as follows: Since allocations (M, m) and (m, M) are 
the only feasible ones and both maximize function (1), it follows that both a and b are E-
actions, and hence selected by the EH-norm. As the H-norm also selects both actions, it 
follows that a principled receiver gets the same payoffs as a selfish one –i.e., both seek to 
maximize money payoffs. With this in mind, it is clear that choosing the action that 
coincides with the announced state of nature is better than the opposite pattern of 
behavior if (note also that moving always a or b cannot be optimal either)  
(1– μ – ρ)∙m + (μ + ρ)∙M > (1– μ – ρ)∙M + (μ + ρ)∙m . 
This implies that receivers should trust the sender’s message and play a best 
response to it if μ + ρ > ½. With respect to the senders, principled ones should tell the 
truth –i.e., announce ‘A’ (‘B’) when state of nature is A (B)- if the subsequent payoff is 
larger than the payoff for lying, that is, if m > M – γ/2. Note that principled senders decide 
not to lie even if they get the lowest possible monetary payoff as a result; this explains 
why the equilibrium is unique. On the other hand and given the receiver’s behavior, selfish 
senders clearly maximize their monetary payoff if they lie. This finishes the proof. 
This analysis can be easily extended to cover other cases, as one where the sender 
(receiver) earns m (M) if the action and the state of nature do not coincide. One can also 
find equilibrium predictions for other parameter constellations than the ones considered 
before. Thus, in case there are few principled players (μ + ρ < ½) but they are ‘principled 
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enough’ –that is, γ  >  2(M  –  m)-, principled senders tell the truth and selfish ones 
randomize their announcements so as to leave receivers uninformed. More precisely, 
selfish senders tell the truth with some probability θ so that receivers are indifferent 
between choices a and b whatever the state of nature: 
                (1– μ – ρ – θ)∙m + (μ + ρ + θ)∙M = (1– μ – ρ – θ)∙M + (μ + ρ + θ)∙m . 
The reader may compute in this case the probability with which receivers should 
choose each move so that selfish senders play a best response by randomizing with 
probability θ. Finally, there exist multiple equilibria if γ  <  2(M  – m) for the principled 
senders, as they may find sometimes profitable to lie –to get some intuition of this result, 
consult Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) for a theoretical analysis of the game when all 
players are selfish. 
Finally, we note that our prior equilibrium analysis crucially hinges on the 
assumption that senders cannot keep silent. To illustrate this point neatly, consider the 
sender-receiver game previously studied, but assume now that the sender can only send a 
truthful message or stay silent –e.g., if state of nature is A, she can only send message ‘A’ 
or keep silent. Equilibrium predictions in this case are straightforward once one notes that 
both the H-norm and the EH-norm allow the sender to submit the truthful message or stay 
silent. First, and whatever her type, the receiver obviously maximizes her payoff by 
trusting the message (in case she receives one), while she is indifferent between any 
action if she receives no message. Given this, both selfish and principled senders should 
remain silent. Intuitively, principled types suffer a cost when they utter a false message, 
but not when they conceal information (both norms allow silence). As a result, they maximize 
their payoff by providing no information, that is, exactly as a standard analysis would 
predict.13
Experimental  evidence  for  prediction  6: Gneezy (2005) reports lab data from two 
sender-receiver games which are similar to the one analyzed before (when silence is not 
permitted): A first one in which M = 6 and m= 5 and a second one such that M = 15 and 
m= 5 (all the reported amounts are in US dollars). The only difference from our prior 
analysis is that receivers were never informed about the values of M and m –in fact, they 
did not know anything about the actual payoffs, even that they were inverse, and senders 
could only tell them whether a or b were payoff-maximizing. To properly study the 
receiver’s equilibrium behavior in this setting, therefore, one should make the analysis 
conditional on the receiver’s beliefs about M and m.  
                                                 
13 In other words, principled people in our model care about lies of commission, but not about lies of 
omission (silence). We suspect, however, that some actual senders dislike lies of omission and hence 
would tell the truth in this game (provided that m and M are close enough). An experimental 
analysis of this game could provide evidence on this respect. 
 22
To simplify the exposition, we then focus on the senders’ behavior. Gneezy (2005) 
indicates that among 50 senders who were asked to guess the receiver’s reaction to their 
message (they were paid for accuracy), a majority of them (82 percent) expected the 
receiver to trust their message –as indeed mostly happened.14 For this group of players, 
our model predicts that selfish senders should tell a lie while principled types should not, 
provided that γ is large enough. Indeed 36 percent of the senders lied when M  = 6, 
whereas that number rose to 52 percent when M  = 15. Observe that our model can 
explain this significant increase: As principled senders tell the truth if γ > 2(M – m), they 
are less likely to do that as the difference M - m increases (this is particularly true if one 
assumes some heterogeneity in the distribution of γ).  
Again consistent with our model, additional evidence from Gneezy (2005) suggests 
that people tell the truth because they have some kind of preference for that. In a dictator 
game in which dictators could choose between (dictator, dummy) allocations (M, 5) and 
(5, M), Gneezy reports that 66 and 90 percent of the dictators chose their payoff-
maximizing allocation when M = 6 and M = 15, respectively. Since these fractions are 
much higher than the corresponding percentages of deception mentioned in the previous 
paragraph for sender-receiver games with identical payoffs, it seems reasonable to assert 
that “it is not only care for others that motivate behavior, but also aversion to lying” 
(Gneezy, 2005, p. 388).15
We stress that Gneezy used a between-subjects design, that is, subjects played 
only one of the games (i.e., either one of the sender-receiver games or one of the dictator 
games). Further, the available allocations (M, m) and (m, M) in the above mentioned 
treatments were equally fair –at least according to the E-function (1). In contrast, 
participants in Hurkens and Kartik (forthcoming) played both a sender-receiver game and 
a payoff-preserving dictator game in which only one of the two available allocations was an 
E-allocation -as in Gneezy (2005), receivers were uninformed about the payoff 
constellation. For instance, the available (sender, receiver) allocations were (4, 12) and (5, 
4) in one treatment, so that (4, 12) is the only E-allocation. Interestingly, this treatment 
allows us to separate our three types in equilibrium (a proof of this is left to the reader). In 
                                                 
14 The paper does not specify in which treatment these 50 senders participated –i.e., the value of M-, 
but this seems immaterial since senders knew that receivers were totally uninformed on this issue. 
15 Our model predicts that any type of dictator should choose her payoff-maximizing allocation in 
both dictator games and it is then consistent with the difference in behavior between the dictator 
games and the corresponding sender-receiver games. However, it fails to explain why some dictators 
chose to be generous with the co-player. We speculate that they felt obliged to follow a norm of 
courtesy or chivalry like: “Among two fair allocations, choose the one that favors your co-player”. 
This could additionally explain why there was less compliance with this norm when its cost increased 
–i.e., when M = 15. 
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effect, provided that most receivers trust the message in the sender-receiver game (as it 
indeed happened) and that γ and μ  +  ρ are large enough, selfish types should choose 
allocation (5, 4) in the dictator game and lie in the sender-receiver game, H-types should 
choose allocation (5, 4) in the dictator game and tell the truth in the sender-receiver 
game, and EH-types should choose allocation (4, 12) and tell the truth in the sender-
receiver game. In line with this, the authors report that around 33% of the 
senders/dictators acted as our selfish types, 43% as our H-types, and 19% as our EH-
types (the remaining 5 % of the subjects chose the E-allocation and lied).16 Consequently, 
this evidence is well in line with our 3-types assumption. 
Additional studies also show that some people tell the truth even if that goes 
contrary to their material interest, especially if the cost is not high. In Sánchez-Pagés and 
Vorsatz (2007), participants play 50 times with re-matching a similar sender-receiver 
game to that of Gneezy (2005) –receivers are informed about the values of M  and m, 
though. Although the theoretical analysis of this repeated game is complex, the fact that 
along the last 40 rounds both the fraction of truthful messages and that of trusting 
behavior are significantly above the standard prediction of 50 percent seems in line with 
our model, even if the authors did not include in the analysis the data from the first 10 
rounds, when the rate of truth-telling was much higher.17 In line with our model, the rate 
of deception increased when M increased from 2 to 9 points, while keeping m constant. 
See also Cai and Wang (2006) for additional evidence.▪ 
Prediction 7: Truth-telling may decrease after a history of deception. 
Example: Consider again the sender-receiver game of prediction 6, now assuming 
that the players play it twice and that they change roles after playing the first round –more 
precisely, we assume without loss of generality that player 1 is sender in the first round 
and receiver in the second round. The analysis of this game will allow us to show that 
principled types care about previous history: They are less likely to tell the truth if they 
were deceived before –consult Sen (1997) on history-dependent preferences.  
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the parameter constellation is the most 
propitious for principled senders to tell the truth (see prediction 6). Furthermore, we focus 
our analysis on the second round, assuming that player 1 deceived player 2 in the first 
round. This means that player 1 deviated from any of our two norms (see definitions 6 and 
7) in the first round, and hence no principled player 2 suffers any psychological cost if she 
deviates as well in the second round. Consequently, the utility of any principled player in 
this subgame coincides always with her monetary payoff –i.e., they have the same 
                                                 
16 As Hurkens and Kartik (forthcoming) note, a selfish sender would tell the truth if she (incorrectly) 
believed that the receiver is most likely to distrust her message. Due to this, the 43% of subjects 
who told the truth and chose (5, 4) might be an overestimation of the actual proportion of H-types.  
17 Paradoxically, receivers did not anticipate so much truth-telling during those first 10 rounds, that 
is, they did not trust the messages in a proportionate manner. 
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incentives as a selfish type. As a result, we can apply here a result in Sánchez-Pagés and 
Vorsatz (2007) which indicates that the equilibrium rate of truth-telling in this subgame 
should be 50 percent if all players are selfish. Since this rate is smaller than the one 
predicted in the one-shot game if μ + ρ > ½ (see prediction 6), our model hence predicts a 
decline in truth-telling after a history of deception. 
This result provides further insights into players’ preferences for honesty. Our 
model assumes that principled people are (conditionally) lie-averse, but a natural, 
alternative hypothesis is a fixed cost of lying (see for instance Ellingsen and Johannesson, 
2004), which could be modeled by assuming that principled types get a payoff of γ−)(zxi  
when deviating from their respective norms and  otherwise. In other words, this 
hypothesis indicates that principled people feel badly when they lie, independently of what 
others do. It is clear that this hypothesis cannot predict any change in behavior depending 
on previous history, and hence is inconsistent with our prior result. Experimental evidence 
on this regard should be welcome.▪ 
)(zxi
4.2 Adding anger to the model 
According to Thomas Hobbes, “covenants without the sword are nothing but 
words”. While the experimental evidence that we have reviewed so far is somehow 
inconsistent with this pessimistic point of view (some people honor their word even if they 
expect no sanctions otherwise), introspection suggests that one can foster truth-telling by 
threatening to sanction liars. However, this raises a question, that is, given that using the 
‘sword’ is often costly, why do people punish? Perhaps one reason is that they feel angry 
at cheaters. We can model this idea by slightly changing principled (i.e., either EH or H 
types) players’ utility function: 
γ−)(zxi  · r (ψ, z)                            if ∉i  R (ψ, z), (0< γ) 
    = { )(zui I(z)zxzx j
zRj
i ⋅⋅− ∉ )}({max)( )(α              if ∈i  R (ψ, z),   (0< α ≤1)         
     
where  is an indicator function that takes value 0 if nobody deviates –i.e., if 
- and 1 otherwise. That is, we assume that principled players get angry when 
someone deviates from the norm that they find binding, and want to punish the well-off 
deviator (this assumption is probably unrealistic but sufficient in two-player games, which 
are our focus here; more complex patterns could be easily introduced). In this regard, 
parameter α can be interpreted as the maximum amount of money that an angry player is 
willing to spend in order to reduce the earnings of the best-off deviator in one monetary 
unit. The available experimental data on punishment suggests that people are rarely 
willing to punish if the cost is larger than the harm imposed, which explains assumption 0< 
α ≤1 –see López-Pérez (2008) on this. Importantly, note that principled players do not get 
angry if they breached the norm themselves; intuitively, a deviant player should not get 
)(zI
NzR =)(
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annoyed at someone who misbehaved as her. The interested reader may consult López-
Pérez (2008) for a more detailed discussion of these assumptions. 
Prediction 8: People may punish co-players for deceiving them, even if punishment 
is costly. The availability of sanctions may foster truth telling. 
Example: Assume that the sender-receiver game of prediction 6 has now an 
additional stage in which, after discovering whether the sender’s message was truthful, the 
receiver can spend money out of her endowment to punish the sender. More precisely, 
each monetary unit spent by the receiver reduces the sender’s payoff in p>0 monetary 
units. If )mM(2 −>γ and μ  +  ρ  > ½ the game has a unique perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (except marginal cases): 
o Selfish receivers never punish, while principled ones spend their endowment to 
punish the sender if 1< p∙ α and the sender lied before (they spend no money 
otherwise). 
o Whatever their type, receivers trust the sender’s message and play the action 
that coincides with the state of nature announced in the message. 
o Principled senders tell the truth. Selfish senders lie if 1 > p∙α or μ + ρ <
m·p
mM −
, 
and tell the truth otherwise. 
The proof of this result goes as follows: To start, it is clear that selfish receivers 
should never spend money to reduce the other player’s payment. In turn, principled 
receivers should feel angry at the sender only if she deviated from the H or the EH-norm. 
In this game, that occurs only if the sender lied before. If this is the case, they should 
punish the sender if m – α M < – α (M – mp) ? 1 < p∙ α (we are implicitly assuming here M 
– mp > 0,  that is, the receiver cannot reduce the sender’s earnings to zero; the receiver 
would not spend her whole endowment otherwise).  
Further, an argument similar to that of proposition 2 indicates that, whatever their 
type, receivers maximize their payoff if they trust the sender’s message, and that 
principled senders should tell the truth if )mM(2 −>γ . Finally, selfish agents would 
rather tell the truth if the probability that they are punished (which, recall, requires 1 < 
p∙α) is high enough, that is, if 
        m > (μ + ρ)∙(M – mp) + (1– μ – ρ)∙M ? μ + ρ >
m·p
mM − , 
while they should lie otherwise (they are indifferent if the previous expression holds 
with equality; in this marginal case there are multiple equilibria). This finishes the proof. 
 Experimental evidence for prediction 8: The previous analysis is consistent with some of 
the experimental results from Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007). First, there is 
substantial punishment and most of it is directed towards liars –interestingly, though, 
receivers do not punish liars if they did not trust them before, that is, if they were not 
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deceived. Second, the rate of punishment positively depends on its effectiveness: The rate 
of punishment of a lie was equal to 42.8% if p=9 and equal to 25.2% if p=2. Third, 
punishment is primarily a response to deception, not to the distribution of material 
payoffs. Thus, the rate of punishment is equal to 13.4% after a sincere message that was 
distrusted, but rises to 42.8% after a lie that was trusted –this data refers to the 
treatment when p=9, but a similar increase occurs if p=2. However the (sender, receiver) 
allocation was (9, 1) in both situations, which indicates that the increase in punishment 
was the result of deception and not, say, of the inequality in players’ earnings –hence, this 
evidence goes contrary to models of inequity aversion like Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), or more generally to any model that assumes that 
punishment should only depend on the available money vectors 
Fourth, both truth-telling and trusting tend to increase if punishment is available. 
Fifth, truth-telling decreases if its cost increases, that is, if the difference M – m increases, 
even if punishment is available. Sixth, and consistent with our hypothesis that principled 
types should be the only ones who punish, Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) indicate 
that those subjects who punish liars most are also most likely to tell the truth (the authors 
could study this issue because subjects rotated roles in their treatment). ▪ 
Our previous analysis considered the sanction of deception. However, the EH-types 
may also punish unfair behavior –i.e., deviations from the EH-path of a game. Further, 
games with punishment opportunities and communication introduce an interesting 
variable, that is, threats to punish. When are they credible? We illustrate these two points 
in what follows.  
Prediction  9: Unfair behavior is often punished, and that tends to reduce self-
interested behavior and foster players’ trust. Threats to punish unfair behavior are credible 
if the proportion of principled types is large and the cost of punishment is sufficiently low. 
Example  and  experimental  evidence: We consider the two-player hold-up game of 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004). In this game, player 1 (the seller) chooses first 
whether to invest in some project, thus incurring in a sunk cost of 60 Swedish kronor 
(SEK). Both players get zero money if the seller does not invest, while they pass to play an 
ultimatum game with stake size 100 SEK otherwise (this money represents the revenues 
from the investment). That is, player 2 (the buyer) can now offer some money out of the 
100 SEK, and player 1 can accept or reject that offer. The sharing is implemented if player 
1 accepts, while no player gets any money if player 1 rejects (in addition and 
independently of her decision here, player 1 must always pay the sunk cost of the 
investment). 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) experimentally study three treatments. In the 
first treatment, there is no communication. In the second one, player 2 can send a 
message before the seller makes the investment decision. In the third treatment, player 1 
can send a message if she chooses to invest (no restrictions were put on the content of the 
 27
message). Clearly, the second treatment invited promises while the third one invited 
threats. 
What does our model predict in each treatment? Observe first that the overall game 
has a unique E-allocation, which is obtained if player 1 invests, player 2 offers 80 SEK and 
player 1 accepts (once the sunk cost is discounted, both players end up earning 20 SEK in 
such a way). For this reason, the EH-norm commends to follow that path of play in the 
game with no communication, while one should announce to follow that path and honor 
always her prior announcement if she can communicate. Further, the H-norm only restricts 
behavior if someone can send messages, and commends to play as announced before. 
Taking into account this and the induced utility payoffs, our model replicates the 
four main experimental results reported by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004).18 First, low 
offers are often rejected. According to our model, this occurs in any treatment when an 
EH-seller gets angry at a deviation from the (seller, buyer) ‘E-sharing’ (80, 20) and her 
anger intensity α is high enough (however and since α is never larger than one, player 1 
should never reject an offer larger than 50), or when an H-seller has threatened to reject 
low offers in the treatment with seller communication and her parameter γ is large (hence, 
our analysis predicts more rejections of low offers in the seller communication treatment 
than in the no-communication treatment, which is in line with the reported evidence). 
 Second, many agents propose an equal split of the net surplus, that is, sharing 
(80, 20). They are the EH-buyers, who feel committed to follow the EH-norm if their 
parameter γ is large. Furthermore, and consistent again with the data, our model predicts 
that the average offer will be larger when communication is available. In the seller 
communication treatment, H-sellers can credibly threat to reject low offers; as a result 
selfish buyers raise their offers with respect to the no communication treatment. In the 
buyer communication treatment, in turn, promises are binding for the H-buyers and they 
must be generous enough to induce the seller to invest (the data indicates that buyers 
often made explicit promises in their messages, and they rarely violated them). 
Third, communication increases investment. On one hand, H-buyers can commit to 
make a generous offer in the buyer communication treatment, and that should entice 
sellers to invest. On the other hand, sellers can ensure higher offers by credibly 
threatening to reject low ones in the seller communication treatment. This should raise the 
investment rate as well. Fourth, promises are more credible than threats in this game. 
More precisely, promises to make a generous offer in the buyer communication treatment 
are not violated, but threats to reject offers lower than 80 are often neglected in the seller 
communication treatment. As an illustration of this second point, the authors report an 
extreme case in which one seller accepted a (30, 70) split even if she had threatened 
                                                 
18 To shorten the exposition, we do not provide a complete equilibrium analysis here, but one can get 
some hints about this from the detailed study of the ultimatum game without prior communication in 
López-Pérez (2008).  
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before not to accept lower offers than (80, 20). This example suggests why such threats 
are not credible: They are rather costly to honor and the effectiveness of punishment is 
not very high –this is especially true if the offer is larger than 50; in fact, and as we noted 
above, our model predicts that no such offer will ever be rejected if α ≤ 1. Promises, in 
contrast, are binding if parameter γ is large enough. Since we have not restricted the 
upper value of this, promises can be in principle ‘more binding’ than threats.  
Finally, we note that our model can also explain much of the evidence from Brandts 
and Charness (2003). In the two-player game that the authors studied, player 1 
announces her intended move and then each player chooses between a fair and an unfair 
move; afterwards player 2 can either punish or reward player 1. Consistent with our 
model, they show that deception is significantly punished (see also Ostrom et al., 1992). 
In addition, Ellingsen et al. (2006) show that people cease to be cooperative and honest 
with others who did not cooperate before. This is very well in line with two important 
intuitions of our model, that is, path-dependency (recall prediction 7) and the idea that 
people respect norms reciprocally. ▪                
4.3 Other possible extensions 
We may consider three additional extensions. First, the model assumes that 
principled players’ bad feelings do not depend on the specific deviation that they make 
from their binding norm. But remorse might be higher depending on the material 
consequences of the deviation –e.g., cheating in a medical article might generate more 
remorse than cheating in a paper on ancient history!  
In fact, Gneezy (2005) provides some evidence that might be consistent with this 
(see however Hurkens and Kartik, forthcoming). In one sender-receiver game in which, 
whatever the state of nature, the receiver could choose between one action leading to 
(sender, receiver) allocations (5, 15) and (6, 5) –as in the other treatments, though, the 
receiver was not informed about the available payoffs- only 17 percent of the senders lied. 
This contrasts with the previously mentioned 36 percent of senders who lied when M = 6 
and m = 5, that is, truth-telling could depend not only on its price ($1 in both treatments), 
but also on the receiver’s loss ($10 in one treatment, and $1 in the other). To explain this 
sort of phenomena, one could assume that parameter γ  positively depends on the 
difference between the other’s payoff had one respected the norm and her actual payoff. 
Second, we mentioned in the introduction two possible reasons why communication 
fosters cooperation: Group identity and social norms. Although this paper shows that a 
parsimonious model based on social norms can explain much evidence, this is not to say 
that group identity plays no role. It seems plausible that people from group X are more 
likely to cooperate with someone who declares to be a member of group X than with 
another person. One could introduce this into the model by making parameter γ  depend 
on the identity of the co-player(s). Note, however, that norms of honesty somehow 
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predate group identity: To understand why saying ‘I belong to group X’ has an effect on 
the others, one must first be able to explain why they believe that message to be sincere. 
Third, our norms are restrictive in that they forbid telling white lies –i.e., lies that, if 
believed by the receiver, will benefit him- and lies that induce moral behavior. For the first 
case, think of a doctor who tells a reassuring lie to an ill patient. For the second one, think 
of the French priest who, when asked by a Nazi official whether he had hidden some 
fugitive Jews in his church, lied by saying that he had not. Our norms would forbid that lie, 
but most of us would agree that it was commendable: Had the priest told the truth, the 
official would have behaved morally wrongly. One can model all these ideas by introducing 
a norm whose prescriptions depend on the actor’s beliefs about other players’ future 
actions. An example is a norm that tolerates a lie when one expects that another player 
will respect the EH-norm if he is deceived. 
5. Conclusion 
Much experimental evidence confirms that communication fosters cooperation. This 
is difficult to explain using standard game-theoretical hypotheses, which largely imply that 
“concepts like lying, credibility, and credulity –all essential features of strategic 
communication- do not have fully satisfactory operational meanings”.19 In this paper we 
argue that communication works mainly because it allows promises and because many 
people care about social norms of cooperation and honesty in a reciprocal manner.20
Our approach throws light on the closely related issues of truth-telling, deception, 
and credibility. When is someone expected to lie? There are two crucial requisites here. 
First, the person should not care (much) about lying. According to our model, people are 
more likely to lie if the expected monetary gain increases -e.g., when the stake size is 
large, the relationship non-repeated (think of house negotiations), and the likelihood of 
being detected by an angry and revengeful co-player low- or if sufficiently many others are 
expected to lie or behave unfairly.21 Second, she should expect others to trust her, as her 
lie would be ineffective otherwise. Heterogeneity is crucial in this regard: Since players’ 
types are private information and a significant part of the population is expected to be 
honest (if truth-telling is not too costly), dishonest guys find easier to cheat others.  
The model can be used to study how pre-play communication affects phenomena as 
diverse as bargaining, collusion between firms, conflict, charity giving, revolutions, team 
                                                 
19 Crawford and Sobel (1982, p. 1450). Among other extensions of their model, they suggest 
“allowing lying to have costs for [sender] S, uncertain to [receiver] R, in addition to those inherent in 
its effect on R’s choice of action” (ibid.). Our paper follows this line. 
20 Emotions like shame and guilt seem crucial here, and our model implicitly recognizes this. Indeed, 
many techniques for detecting lies rely on the idea that lying generates some emotional anxiety. For 
an article on lie detection, consult The Economist, July 8th 2004. 
21 In relation with this, anecdotal evidence indicates that some professional groups like politicians and 
lawyers are expected to lie more frequently than others like doctors or professors; even if this image 
was false, it might become a self-fulfilling prophecy if many people come to believe it. 
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behavior, and voting –e.g., why do voters care about promises by politicians? As an 
illustration, we make two remarks on revolutions and demonstrations, which are typical 
examples of social dilemmas (participants in these events usually demand the provision of 
public goods, like income redistribution or changes in the political system). 
First, our model indicates that people are more likely to join the mass –i.e., to 
cooperate- if pre-play communication is available: By announcing their intention to 
cooperate or by announcing that they are already cooperating, people can encourage 
others to cooperate as well. For this reason, cooperation positively depends on the number 
of message receivers and senders, which implies in turn that groups have an interest in 
controlling mass media. This partly explains, for instance, why rebels in revolutions or 
military takeovers often try to control broadcasting stations from the first moments of the 
rebellion, and why their opponents strive to keep them isolated.22 The following excerpt 
from the September 29th 2007 issue of The Economist about the popular revolts against 
the military dictatorship in Myanmar (former Burma) is enlightening in this respect: 
“One genuine difference [with previous pro-democracy protests in Myanmar] is 
that, in the age of the internet and digital cameras, images of the spectacular 
protests in Yangon, the main city, have spread at lightning speed across Myanmar 
itself, encouraging people in other towns to stage demonstrations of their own; 
and around the world […]” (our emphasis; the military junta largely cut internet 
connections and mobile-phone lines a few days later). 
Second, those groups for which multilateral communication is very costly or 
unfeasible –at least among large numbers of people- should engage in less collective 
action. For instance, K. Marx and F. Engels noted in The Communist Manifesto that 
revolutions were less likely among peasants than among proletarians, one likely reason 
being that geographical distance tended to hinder communication and, as a result, 
cooperation (indeed, Marx and Engels believed that capitalism was ‘digging its own grave’ 
because of its tendency to concentrate workers in large-scale industries).  
To finish, we would like to note that communication does not only give an 
opportunity for making promises; but also one for teaching, thus raising productivity, and 
for discussing moral issues with others –some social researchers have speculated that 
dialogue might have a positive effect in avoiding conflict. To understand all this, however, 
one must understand first why people believe (or not) what others say. This article offers 
some insights in this respect. 
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